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Introduction 
As governments embrace the goal of developing local currency bond markets as an 
alternative to inflows of foreign capital,
3 rating agencies now commonly assign a domestic 
currency rating to sovereigns in addition to a foreign currency one. In Asia, 18 major 
sovereigns with foreign debt ratings now have a domestic currency rating from a major rating 
agency. Usually the domestic rating is higher, reflecting the presumed greater ability and 
willingness of sovereigns to service debt denominated in their own currency. However, the 
gap between the two ratings is uniform neither across borrowers nor across agencies. 
The distinctions between local and foreign currency ratings are likely to have increasingly 
important implications for the development of capital markets globally and in Asia in 
particular. The degree to which rating policies favour a particular currency of denomination 
might provide significant incentives in terms of investor acceptance and market pricing. 
Rating policies might reinforce government policy initiatives and regulations as well.
4  
In this paper, we first provide a comparative overview of domestic and foreign currency 
ratings globally and in Asia in particular. Asian credits are similar to the global sample in 
terms of both the newcomer status of local currency ratings and the tendency for the 
local/foreign currency rating gap to be largest in the lower investment grade/upper 
non-investment grade region. However, differences of opinion among rating agencies 
regarding the relative creditworthiness of local and foreign currency obligations are quite 
pronounced in Asia. Within a linear regression framework, we then examine the determinants 
of the difference between local and foreign currency ratings, and find evidence that 
differences among agencies are driven by distinctions in their overall rating policy rather than 
a distinct Asian factor per se. Other than the paper of Trevino and Thomas (2001), ours is 
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the first to empirically estimate the determinants of the local and foreign currency gap for 
sovereign credits. 
Foreign and local currency ratings 
Over the past few decades, the business of providing sovereign ratings has grown 
considerably. As of 1985, only 15 countries obtained credit agency bond ratings to borrow in 
international capital markets. Most of these countries were rated AAA; less financially strong 
countries relied on bank finance or privately placed bonds. However, over the past 
15-20 years, countries at the lower end of the credit quality spectrum have relied increasingly 
on bond markets, and obtained a credit rating for that purpose. 
Initially, most of the new sovereign ratings applied to foreign currency debt, as sovereigns 
apparently felt little need to obtain a rating for domestic currency obligations. But sovereigns 
gradually moved to having domestic currency ratings, a likely reflection of efforts to increase 
the investor base for domestic currency bonds (Tables 1 and 2). 
Pretty much the same story holds with Asian ratings. Among Asian sovereigns, only Japan 
and Australia had foreign currency ratings as of 1975, but more than half of the 18 Asian 
sovereigns had a foreign currency rating by 1990. And although none had a local currency 
rating before 1990, the catch-up is now complete, which parallels the global rating 
phenomenon (Tables 1 and 3). 
What might drive the rating gap? 
Rating agencies often give higher ratings to the domestic currency obligations of sovereign 
states than to their foreign currency ones. This is a global phenomenon: for instance, the 
average gap between Standard & Poor’s local and foreign currency ratings was 0.7 notches 
globally in late 2004, while the Moody’s gap was 0.4 notches. Differences are often justified 
in terms of the sovereign’s ability to tax and appropriate domestic currency assets, which is 
often judged to be greater than in the case of foreign currency assets. In addition, while the 
sovereign must generate foreign exchange to repay foreign currency debts, it can print 
money to meet domestic currency obligations (see, for example, Fitch Investors Service 
(2003)).
5  
Following this logic, constraints on the sovereign’s ability to print domestic currency would 
tend to reduce the justification for a rating gap. Prime examples would be sovereigns that 
use the currencies of foreign countries, such as Panama and El Salvador. The countries of 
the euro area are also special cases; here the delegation of monetary policy to the ECB has 
greatly diminished the distinctions drawn between local and foreign currency debt.
6 Countries 
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whose local currency obligations are held by foreigners may also have smaller rating gaps. In 
these countries, it is the local banking system, rather than the sovereign, that must hedge 
foreign investments in local currency denominated sovereign debt, and the government may 
be unwilling to print money if that would impose substantial costs on the banking system. 
More generally, the frequent existence of significant political costs to high levels of inflation 
should limit the applicability of the “printing press” argument for high domestic currency 
ratings. 
Another possible exception would be if foreign currency issuance is small relative to the total 
debt outstanding of a sovereign. After all, one of the underlying principles of sovereign debt 
analysis is that sovereign risk always depends on the willingness as well as the ability to pay. 
Given a small enough burden, the sovereign might conceivably make an extra effort to avoid 
default on foreign currency obligations. It is likely that the relatively small size of the 
international bonds of emerging market countries in the early 1980s explains why the default 
experience on bonds at that time was rather limited, despite a range of bank loan 
restructuring programmes. 
Another factor influencing the size of the gap is a purely technical one: there is no rating 
higher than AAA (Aaa) in the rating agencies’ symbology. The additional credit standing that 
a foreign currency AAA credit might gain by being denominated in domestic currency is 
unobservable. In addition, countries that are AA+ can only be raised by one notch, and so 
forth. Notching should thus become more pronounced and frequent as the foreign currency 
rating drifts downwards from AAA and AA, which is in fact what we generally observe both 
globally and in Asia. Little surprise, then, that countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines 
have marked notching relative to highly rated Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, which 
have little to no room for a notching-up on their domestic currency obligations.  
On the other hand, it appears that the gap peaks in the mid-grade rating category BB. For 
instance, according to Standard & Poor’s, 83% of all rated sovereigns in the BB category in 
late 2004 had domestic currency obligations that were rated at least one notch higher than 
foreign currency obligations (Table 4). By contrast, the relative advantage of domestic 
currency obligations was much smaller for countries that are further below investment grade; 
only 27% of countries in the B category enjoy a rating gap. For its part, Standard & Poor’s 
posits that low-rated countries face risks, such as high degrees of social and political stress, 
that would also impair their ability to keep servicing domestic obligations in circumstances 
where foreign currency debts were allowed to default (S&P (2002)).  
Asia does follow the same global hump-shaped pattern in the distribution of rating gaps, as is 
evident in Table 4. The propensity for rating gaps to exceed one notch is noticeable in the A 
range, where two out of three sovereigns - Korea and Malaysia - have large gaps. 
Meanwhile, Indonesia has one of the lowest ratings among Asian sovereigns and gets only a 
single one-notch improvement in the local currency rating from only one of the rating 
agencies.  
Differences among the rating agencies 
There are surprisingly sharp differences among the rating agencies with respect to the 
frequency at and degree to which domestic obligations are given favourable ratings. In 
particular, Moody’s tends to notch up its domestic currency rating much less frequently than 
the other agencies; for instance, in November 2004 it gave a higher domestic currency rating 
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Moody’s also assigned a higher foreign currency rating than domestic currency rating in four 
cases,
7 with a relatively small proportion of outstanding foreign currency debt relative to 
foreign exchange reserves always cited as a reason (see Moody’s (2003c,d)). By contrast, 
S&P did not assign a higher foreign currency rating to any sovereign, while Fitch assigned a 
higher foreign currency rating only in the case of Japan. 
Consistent with this global finding, Asian countries see far less notching from Moody’s than 
from Standard & Poor’s (Table 6). In fact, the differences are starker in the case of Asia: the 
average gap between S&P’s foreign and local currency ratings was 0.9 notches in Asia, even 
wider than the 0.6 notch gap for non-Asian countries (Table 6). At the same time, Moody’s 
actually notched Asian countries in the other direction, on average, with a mean Asian gap of 
–0.3 notches compared to a gap of 0.5 notches for non-Asians. This pattern, that the Asia 
subsample shows an accentuation of the differences in notching policies among the 
agencies, has held since 1995, when Asian sovereigns began to receive foreign and local 
currency ratings widely. In the regression analysis to follow, we explore possible reasons 
why this may be the case.  
Regression analysis 
The previous sections present the stylised facts that, in the case of S&P ratings, there is 
more likely to be a gap between the foreign currency and domestic currency ratings if a 
country is in Asia, and that such a gap is likely to be larger if a country is in Asia rather than 
elsewhere. In the case of Moody’s, rating gaps in Asia are smaller than elsewhere. Are these 
facts simply the by-product of different observable endowments among the Asian economies 
versus elsewhere, which might tend to magnify both the gap and the agency differences, 
given the agencies’ respective rating technologies? Or rather, might there be an unobserved 
factor common to Asia that is driving the results, reflecting rating agency biases and/or 
omitted variables?  
Previous literature 
According to general descriptions of the rating process by the rating agencies themselves 
(see Moody’s (2003a, 2004) and S&P (2002, 2004), sovereign local and foreign currency 
ratings are based on a wide array of quantitative and qualitative factors that are intended to 
capture political risk, income and economic structure, growth, monetary policy, budgetary 
and public debt management, and external liquidity and debt. However, quantitative studies 
of ratings - such as Cantor and Packer (1996), Moody’s (2003b) and Borio and Packer 
(2004) - find that most of the variance in Moody’s and S&P ratings can be explained by a 
relatively small number of variables. Typically, the debt burden itself, default history, per 
capita income and economic growth are important as indicators of a country’s wealth and 
ability to pay, and indices of political risk are also important, presumably because they proxy 
for willingness to pay.  
Partly because they have been around longer, the literature is more developed with regard to 
the determinants of foreign currency ratings. Specifically, Cantor and Packer (1996) found 
that per capita income, inflation, external debt, economic development, and default history 
were particularly strong predictors of foreign currency ratings. A weaker relationship existed 
between sovereign ratings and GDP growth and the fiscal balance, and there was no 
statistical relationship between ratings and the external balance. Moody’s (2004) found that 
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per capita income, debt/exports, growth, external transfer risk, and government effectiveness 
explain 91% of the variation in its own foreign currency ratings. In addition to many of the 
above-listed variables, Borio and Packer (2004) also found corruption perceptions to have 
significant explanatory power in predicting variation in a panel of foreign currency ratings. 
The examination of the determinants of local currency ratings includes another study of 
Moody’s (2003b), which found that government debt/government revenue, per capita 
income, growth, and government effectiveness explained 87% of the variation in Moody’s 
local currency ratings. In a study of the gap between local and foreign currency ratings, 
which used a probit methodology, Trevino and Thomas (2001) looked at many of the 
variables discussed above and also added measures of the term structure of bank debt, a 
country’s share of bank lending, bank commitments, bank borrowing/ deposits, reserves and 
IMF credit usage, rating agency dummy variables, and regional dummy variables. The 
authors found regional and rating agency biases present even after the inclusion of these 
variables. 
Methodology 
To address our questions about what is driving the prevalence and magnitude of rating gaps 
in Asia and globally, we estimate regression models for the foreign currency ratings of 
Moody’s and S&P, the local currency ratings of each agency, and the gap between the 
foreign currency and local currency ratings. We also estimate a set of regressions where the 
left-hand side variables are the differences between Moody’s and S&P’s local currency 
ratings, foreign currency ratings, and notching gaps. In each of our regressions, we use a 
fixed effects specification and examine the Asian countries’ fixed effects for evidence of an 
unobserved common factor.  
We proceed by identifying 61 variables that reflect political risk, default history, external debt 
burden, macroeconomic performance, and government financial management, and we 
collect annual data on these variables for the 101 countries that have both foreign currency 
and local currency ratings at either S&P or Moody’s from 1995 to 2003.
8 Ratings are recoded 
numerically with AAA and Aaa equal to 1, AA+ and Aa1 equal to 2, and so on. Each end-year 
rating is assumed to be the function of explanatory variables from that same year, and the 
candidate explanatory variables are listed in Table 7. In many cases, these variables may 
capture overlapping aspects of ability and willingness to repay foreign or local currency debt, 
so we pare the list of variables in each regression by identifying subcategories of variables 
that may capture the same concept. These subcategories are also listed in Table 7. 
We start by fitting a regression model to S&P foreign currency ratings. Within each 
subcategory of variables, we test the fit of each variable separately. For example, we start by 
testing the fit of each of the CPI-related variables. If no CPI variable is significant at the 
.10 level, we proceed to the GDP growth subcategory, leaving out a CPI variable. In cases 
where only one CPI variable is significant, we retain it while testing GDP growth variables. In 
cases where several CPI variables are separately significant, we include them together in the 
regression to see whether they are robust to one another’s inclusion. We then eliminate 
variables that are not robust according to t-statistic, and retain robust CPI variables while 
testing GDP growth variables. After moving through all subcategories in this way, we then 
eliminate variables that are no longer statistically significant at the .10 level to arrive at the 
final S&P foreign currency specification. Hausman tests in nearly every specification suggest 
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that fixed effects rather than random effects are present, so we retain a fixed effects 
specification for consistency throughout. F-tests in every regression specification confirm the 
importance of the fixed effects. All regressions are estimated in SAS with two-way (cross-
sectional and time-series) fixed effects, and we require countries to have more than one 
time-series observation in each regression.  
We follow the same procedure for Moody’s foreign currency ratings, except that the starting 
point is the final S&P specification, for convenience. We first eliminate variables that are not 
significant for Moody’s, and then move through the subcategories again, testing candidate 
variables in the same way as we did in fitting the S&P model.  
Our starting point for the S&P (Moody’s) local currency rating specification is the S&P 
(Moody’s) foreign currency specification. The starting point for the S&P (Moody’s) rating gap 
specification is the union of variables in the S&P (Moody’s) foreign currency and local 
currency specifications. Similarly, the starting point for the S&P-Moody’s foreign currency 
(local currency) rating difference specification is the union of variables in the S&P and 
Moody’s foreign currency (local currency) rating specifications. 
Rating regressions 
The final regressions of S&P and Moody’s foreign currency ratings on full sets of explanatory 
variables are shown in the first two columns of Table 8. In both regressions, all of the 
explanatory variables are significant at the .05 level and take the expected signs. Per capita 
GDP is significant at both agencies, with higher levels of income leading to better ratings. 
While higher per capita GDP may well imply higher costs associated with default, this 
variable is also likely to proxy for other indicators of development and creditworthiness. 
M2/reserves is also significant at both agencies, and this variable captures monetary 
volatility, excess monetary liquidity, and reserve volatility, so that greater variation in this ratio 
leads to a worse foreign currency rating. Investment is significant at both agencies and has 
the expected interpretation: higher rates of investment should generate the ability to repay 
debts. Overall political risk is an important determinant of both agencies’ ratings; higher 
levels of political risk are associated with worse ratings. The importance of political risk is 
underscored by the fact that an additional source of political risk is significant in each 
agency’s ratings, with control of corruption associated with better S&P ratings, and regulatory 
quality associated with better Moody’s ratings. Finally, the time elapsed since the last default 
on foreign currency obligations is also important at both agencies, with longer periods without 
default associated with better ratings.  
The most obvious difference between the agencies’ foreign currency rating methodologies is 
in the treatment of debt and external vulnerability, two critical components of foreign currency 
ratings. Standard & Poor’s appears to focus on total public sector indebtedness, with higher 
public debt/GDP ratios resulting in worse ratings. It also considers exchange rate regime, 
with pegged and managed floating regimes penalised by half a notch. The significance of the 
exchange rate regime variable highlights the view that rigid exchange rates may be a direct 
constraint on debt servicing capacity; if governments must use reserves to defend a 
currency, less foreign exchange remains available for debt servicing. By contrast, Moody’s 
appears to weight more directly the net external debt burden, as a fraction of exports. 
Adding country-specific fixed effects to the regression improves the fit, as all of the cross-
sectional fixed effects are significant. It is noteworthy that although the average of the fixed 
effects in both the S&P and Moody’s regressions implies ratings for Asian sovereigns that 
are 1.4-1.5 notches better on average than for other countries, there is enough variation 
within the country fixed effect coefficients that an F-test cannot reject the hypothesis of no 
difference between Asian and non-Asian countries. Thus, higher credit ratings in Asia can be 
explained more on the basis of better fundamentals in Asian countries and country-specific 
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Regressions of the local currency ratings of each agency on the explanatory variables are 
presented in the final two columns of Table 8. All variables are significant at the .05 level and 
all coefficients take the correct signs. As in the foreign currency rating regressions, per capita 
GDP is an important explanatory variable for both agencies. Public debt/GDP is now 
significant for both agencies as well. However, while Moody’s appears to weight more heavily 
in its assessments the variables of economic growth and M2/reserves, S&P appears to 
weight many more additional variables, including inflation, investment, political risk, control of 
corruption, exchange rate rigidity, the nominal exchange rate change, and the time elapsed 
since the last local currency default. The relative parsimony of the Moody’s regression bears 
out the agency’s own finding that most of the variation in its local currency ratings can be 
explained with just a few variables (Moody’s (2003b)). 
The local currency regression results are consistent with our earlier findings regarding Asian 
foreign currency ratings. While the average Asian fixed effect is 1.1-1.2 notches better than 
that of non-Asian countries, this difference is not statistically significant, so we conclude that 
better average Asian local currency ratings tend to be driven by fundamentals and country-
specific effects rather than an “Asia factor”. 
One of the drawbacks of the above approach to discerning differences in rating agency 
methodology is the fact that the agencies have rated different sets of countries over time, 
and it may be these differences in samples, rather than differences in methodology, that 
drive the regression results. To control for this effect, we impose the requirement that the 
S&P and Moody’s samples be the same and rerun the regressions (Table 9). The 
explanatory variables from the foreign currency rating regressions are highly robust, with all 
variables still significant at the .10 level and all coefficients remaining at roughly the same 
order of magnitude. The Moody’s local currency regression is also robust to the sample 
change. The S&P local currency regression is slightly less robust, with three variables 
becoming insignificant when we change the sample: the investment, political risk score, and 
exchange rate rigidity variables are no longer significant at the .10 level.  
Rating gap regressions 
Next, we report the results of regressions of the gap between local and foreign currency 
ratings of S&P and Moody’s on the explanatory variables (Table 10, first two columns). Our 
convention is that a positive gap means that the local currency rating is better than the 
foreign currency rating. Among the variables, inflation, M2, and M2/reserves are important 
determinants of the gap between foreign and local currency ratings at both agencies. High 
inflation tends to lead to a smaller gap between ratings, consistent with high levels of inflation 
eroding the creditworthiness of the sovereign across the board and thus diminishing the 
relative safety of local currency obligations. The positive coefficients on the change in M2 or 
M2/reserves suggest that monetary expansion is initially associated with relatively safer local 
currency obligations, though the negative coefficients on the volatility of the same variables 
suggest that this effect has diminishing marginal returns, perhaps for the same reason that 
high inflation is associated with a diminished rating gap.  
Some variables explain rating gaps for Moody’s rating only. Per capita GDP is significant in 
the Moody’s regression, with higher levels of income associated with smaller rating gaps. 
This variable may well be picking up the fact that sovereigns with the best foreign currency 
ratings cannot enjoy a rating gap because they are already at the top of the rating scale, 
though it is not clear why such an effect would only hold for Moody’s. Saving is also 
significant in the Moody’s regression, with higher saving rates permitting larger rating gaps. 
When a sovereign can tap a large pool of local savings, Moody’s may view it as easier for the 
sovereign to roll over local currency debt and avoid default. Public debt/GDP leads to smaller 
rating gaps in the Moody’s regression, which suggests that Moody’s views very heavy debt 
burdens as making default more likely on all debt, regardless of currency. Real effective 
exchange rate overvaluation also leads to larger gaps at Moody’s, and this may illustrate the BIS Papers No 30  181
 
fact that it is expensive to maintain an overvalued exchange rate, and using foreign 
exchange to defend a currency reduces the availability of foreign exchange for repaying 
debt.  
A few variables enter uniquely into the S&P gap regressions as well. For instance, the 
measures of regulatory quality and import cover lead to larger rating gaps in the S&P 
regression, while the time elapsed since local currency default narrows the gap. The latter 
result perhaps indicates that S&P is more likely to view longer default-free periods as an 
important sign of creditworthiness on all obligations, which should diminish any foreign-local 
currency differential.  
In the gap regressions, the fixed effect for Asian countries is even more muted than it was in 
the simple foreign and local currency rating regressions. Both the Moody’s and S&P 
regressions suggest that the average expected Asian rating gap is nearly equal to the 
expected gap in other countries. This finding supports the view that the different degree of 
“notching” in Asia between local and foreign currency ratings can be better explained by 
broadly applicable fundamentals than by Asia-specific factors.  
Rating difference regressions 
The regressions discussed above suggest that the rating agencies may weight variables 
differently when they assess foreign and local currency creditworthiness. In order to further 
investigate how the rating agency methodologies differ, we regress the difference between 
S&P and Moody’s foreign currency ratings, and then the difference between their local 
currency ratings, on the explanatory variables, with the results reported in the final two 
columns of Table 10. Here, our convention is that positive differences imply a better rating by 
Moody’s.  
As in the gap regressions, inflation, M2, and M2/reserves are important determinants of the 
differences between the agencies’ foreign and local currency ratings. S&P tends to weight 
inflation more heavily as a negative factor in local currency ratings, but relatively less heavily 
as a negative factor for foreign currency ratings. S&P also tends to weight monetary 
expansion less heavily as a negative factor for both foreign and local currency ratings. 
Additionally, control of corruption, domestic debt/GDP, budget revenue/GDP, short-term 
debt/GDP, exchange rate changes, and time elapsed since default all appear to be weighted 
significantly differently across the agencies. 
Two final findings are that while average Asian fixed effects do not provide assistance in 
predicting differences between Moody’s and S&P foreign currency credit ratings, there is a 
significant Asian effect in the difference between S&P and Moody’s local currency ratings. 
That is, S&P’s Asian local currency rating are significantly better than those of Moody’s, even 
after controlling for differences in rating methodology.  
Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the patterns of the foreign and local currency ratings of S&P and 
Moody’s both in Asia and globally, with a particular emphasis on whether ratings and the 
gaps between foreign and local currency ratings are driven by the same factors in Asia as 
elsewhere in the world, and whether the different rating agencies take the same approach to 
ratings and gaps. We find that rating gaps in Asia can be explained by many of the same 
factors that drive gaps globally, and that the evidence for an Asia-wide effect on ratings is 
slim. 
The local-foreign currency rating gaps of both agencies can be partly explained by inflation, 
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in methodology. Namely, the gaps of S&P appear to depend more heavily on regulatory 
quality, import cover, and time elapsed since default, while the gaps in Moody’s ratings are 
better explained by per capita income, saving, public debt/GDP, and the real effective 
exchange rate overvaluation. At the same time, an Asia factor may help to explain the 
difference of local currency ratings between agencies, since S&P’s local currency Asian 
ratings are significantly better than those of Moody’s even after controlling for differences in 
methodology.  
As domestic bond markets grow in importance, understanding local currency sovereign 
ratings and what makes them different from foreign currency ratings will become increasingly 
important. This paper suggests that there are important differences in the way rating 
agencies view the relationship between foreign and local currency ratings, a fact that could 
have implications for investors and regulators alike.  
 
Table 1 
Domestic and foreign currency sovereign ratings 
Number of Asian sovereigns in parentheses 
New foreign currency ratings  New domestic currency 
ratings   
Number of sovereigns 
Pre-1985    15 (3)    0 (0) 
1986-90    22 (8)    2 (0) 
1991-95    20 (3)    32 (7) 
1996-2000    55 (4)    65 (9) 
2001-04    17 (0)    20 (2) 
Total    129 (18)    119 (18) 
Note: Sovereigns are deemed to have a rating if one of the three major agencies has a rating outstanding. The 
United States did not receive a foreign currency rating until 1992. 




The credit quality of newly assigned sovereign ratings 
New foreign currency ratings  New domestic currency 
ratings   
Median rating 
Pre-1985 AAA    ... 
1986-90   A   AA+ 
1991-95   BB+   AAA 
1996-2000   BB   BBB 
2001-04   B+   B+ 
Note: Sovereigns are deemed to have a rating if one of the three major agencies has a rating outstanding. 
Sources: Fitch Investors Service; Moody’s Investors Service; Standard & Poor’s. 
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Table 3 
Local and foreign currency credit rating of 
selected Asian economies, November 2004 
 S&P  Moody’s  Fitch  R&I 
  LC  FC  LC FC LC FC LC FC 
Australia   AAA    AAA  Aaa  Aaa  AAA    AA+  AAA    AA+ 
China BBB+    BBB+    –    A2    A    A–    –    A 
Hong Kong SAR   AA–   A+    Aa3    A1    AA+    AA–    AA    AA– 
India   BB+    BB    Ba2    Baa3    BB+    BB+    –  BBB 
Indonesia    B+   B    B2    B2    B+    B+    –    B 
Japan   AA–    AA–    A2    Aaa    AA–    AA    AAA    AAA 
Korea   A+    A–    A3    A3    AA–    A    –    A– 
Macau SAR   –   –    A1    A1    –    –    –    – 
Malaysia   A+    A–    A3    Baa1    A+    A–    –    A– 
Mongolia   B    B    –    –    –    –    –    – 
New Zealand   AAA   AA+    Aaa    Aaa    AAA    AA+    AAA    AA+ 
Pakistan   BB    B+    B2    B2    –    –    –    – 
Papua New Guinea  B+   B    B1    B1    B+    B    –    – 
Philippines   BBB–    BB    Ba2    Ba2    BB+    BB    –    BBB– 
Singapore    AAA   AAA    Aaa    Aaa    AAA    AAA    AAA    AAA 
Taiwan, China   AA–   AA–    Aa3    Aa3    AA    A+    –    AA 
Thailand   A    BBB+    Baa1    Baa1    A–  BBB    –    BBB+ 
Vietnam   BB    BB–    –    B1    BB    BB–    –    – 
Note: LC refers to local currency rating, and FC to foreign currency rating. 
Sources: Fitch Investors Service; Japan Rating and Investment Information, Inc (R&I); Moody’s Investors 
Service; Standard & Poor’s. 
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Table 4 
Domestic vs foreign currency rating 
gaps by rating, November 2004 
Asian countries in parentheses 
No difference 
Domestic currency debt 
rated higher by exactly 
one notch 
Domestic currency debt 
rated higher by more 




Number of sovereigns 
AAA    18  (2)   0   0 
AA  8  (2)   2  (1)   0 
A   7  (0)   8  (1)   5  (2) 
BBB   2  (1)   6  (0)   6  (1) 
BB    3 (0)    11 (2)    4 (1) 
B    18 (1)    4 (2)    1 (1) 
Note: Ratings indicate the broad letter grade category, eg AA stands for credits rated AA+, AA and AA–. 





Domestic vs foreign currency rating gaps, November 2004 
Asian countries in parentheses 
Moody’s S&P 
 
Number of sovereigns 
4-notch  differential   –   – 
3-notch   6  (0)   8  (0) 
2-notch   7  (0)   8  (4) 
1-notch   15  (2)   31  (6) 
No  difference   62  (10)   59  (6) 
–1-notch   2  (0)   – 
–2-notch   1  (1)   – 
–3-notch   –   – 
–4-notch   –   – 
–5-notch   1  (1)   – 
Total    94 (14)    106 (16) 
Sources: Moody’s Investors Service; Standard & Poor’s. 
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Table 6 
Notching of local currency credit rating 
of Asian economies, November 2004 








Australia 0  0  1  1 
China 0  –  1  – 
Hong Kong SAR  1  1  2  1 
India 1  –2  0  – 
Indonesia 1  0  0  – 
Japan 0  –5  –1  0 
Korea 2  0  2  – 
Macau SAR  –  0  –  – 
Malaysia 2  1  2  – 
Mongolia 0  –  –  – 
New Zealand  1  0  1  1 
Pakistan 2  0  –  – 
Papua New Guinea  1  0  1  – 
Philippines 2  0  1  – 
Singapore 0  0  0  0 
Taiwan, China  0  0  2  – 
Thailand 2  0  2  – 
Vietnam 1  –  1  – 
Average 0.94  –0.33  1.00  0.60 
Average (ex Japan)  1.00  0.00  1.14  0.75 
Note: LC refers to local currency rating, and FC to foreign currency rating. 
Sources: Fitch Investors Service; Japan Rating and Investment Information, Inc (R&I); Moody’s Investors 
Service; Standard & Poor’s. 
 




Explanatory regression variables 
Category Subcategory  Variables 
Inflation  Inflation over 1 year, 5 years and 10 years 
Log inflation over 1 year, 5 years and 10 years 
GDP  Log per capita GDP 
Per capita GDP 
GDP growth 1-year rate 
GDP growth 3-year rate 
GDP growth 3-year average annual rate 
Monetary  M2: 1-year, 5-year, 10-year, % change  
M2: log 1-year, 5-year and 10-year change 
M2: 1-year, 5-year and 10-year volatility  
M2: log 1-year, 5-year and 10-year volatility  
Monetary/liquidity M2/reserves:  1-year, 5-year, 10-year, % change  
M2/reserves: log 1-year, 5-year and 10-year change  
M2/reserves: 1-year, 5-year and 10-year volatility  




Political Political Transparency  International Corruption Perceptions Index 
Political risk score (Political Risk Services) 
Government control of corruption (latest available, 
Kaufmann 
et al (2003)) 
Government effectiveness (latest available, Kaufmann 
et al (2003)) 
Government regulatory quality (latest available, Kaufmann

















Exchange rate  Nominal exchange rate 1-year change 
Real effective exchange rate, % deviation from LT 
average (JPMorgan Chase) 
IMF exchange rate regime dummy variable (pegs and 
managed floats are coded as 1) 
External position 
Default  Years since foreign currency default 
Log years since foreign currency default 
Years since local currency default 
Log years since local currency default 
Sources: Transparency International; Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide; Kaufmann et al 
(2003); EIU; Datastream; Standard & Poor’s; JPMorgan Chase. 
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Table 8 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s 
foreign and local currency ratings 
Agency  S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 








R-squared   .9949    .9961   .9879   .9951 
F-test of significance of 
fixed effects, p-value   <.0001    <.0001   <.0001   <.0001 
Hausman test, fixed/ 
random effects, p-value   .0068    .1642   .0026   .0004 
Degrees of freedom   329   235  358  340 
Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Macroeconomic          
Inflation, log 1-yr         0.366  3.930 
Inflation, 1-yr        
Inflation, log 10-yr        
Per capita GDP, log  –3.016 –7.870 –2.231 –5.360 –1.752 –3.170 –0.985 –2.950
GDP growth, 3-yr avg       –0.093 –3.460
M2, 10-yr % chg        
M2, log 10-yr % chg        
M2, 1-yr log volatility         0.334  2.600   
M2, 5-yr volatility        
M2/reserves, 5-yr log 
volatility   0.463  2.680  0.908  4.950      0.734  4.840
M2/reserves, log 10-yr 
% chg         
M2/reserves, 1-yr volatility         
M2/reserves, log 5-yr % 
chg         
Investment  –0.053 –2.970 –0.083 –4.210 –0.064 –3.000  
Saving         
Political          
Political risk score  –0.034   2.560 –0.030  1.970 –0.045 –2.630   
Regulatory  quality    –1.418 –6.300    
Control of corruption  –1.264 –4.120   –1.466 –3.700   
Government finance          
Public  debt/GDP   0.041  7.040      0.072  9.690   0.037  7.300
Domestic  debt/GDP        
Budget  revenue/GDP         
External          
Net  debt/exports       0.004  2.420      
Short-term  debt/GDP         
Import  cover         
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Table 8 (cont) 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s 
foreign and local currency ratings 
Agency  S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 








Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
External ( c o n t )           
Exchange  rate  rigidity   0.493   2.580      0.584  2.510     
Exchange rate, 1-yr chg          –0.012 –3.320   
Real effective exchange 
rate          
Years since foreign 
currency  default,  log  –0.346  –2.910 –0.236 –2.790     
Years since local currency 
default,  log         –0.661 –2.110    
Years since local currency 
default              
Time-series fixed effects         
Year 1995           –0.143  –0.580
Year 1996  –0.197  –0.650  0.013  0.040 –0.854 –2.330 –0.151 –0.610
Year 1997  –0.031  –0.110  0.482  1.650 –0.613 –1.790 –0.049 –0.230
Year 1998  –0.255  –1.400  0.376  1.960 –0.461 –2.070   0.195   1.220
Year 1999  –0.298  –1.810  0.224  1.240 –0.154 –0.730   0.023   0.160
Year 2000  –0.196  –1.230  0.121  0.710 –0.237 –1.150   0.035   0.250
Year 2001  –0.244  –1.580  0.158  0.950 –0.123 –0.590 –0.003 –0.020
Year 2002  –0.341 –2.380 –0.259 –1.590 –0.327 –1.760 –0.029 –0.220
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects                
Argentina 42.066    11.990 36.030   9.340 30.755  6.210  20.740   6.650
Australia  38.690   10.100 29.766  7.150 27.594  5.110   8.888   2.590
Austria          24.271  4.310   7.661   2.100
Bahrain 37.817    10.290     26.200   5.090     
Barbados                
Belgium         21.543   3.750     
Bolivia     31.343   10.230        
Botswana  35.650    11.300     25.630  5.710  12.167   4.310
Brazil 39.252    11.950 34.015   9.460 27.670  5.950  19.606   6.750
Bulgaria 35.604    11.350 33.375   10.180 26.324  6.060  17.419   6.340
Canada  36.597  9.060 29.884  7.130 24.147  4.270   7.431   2.060
Chile 37.966    11.700 32.059   9.160 26.727  5.840  12.227   4.190
Colombia 33.313    10.380 26.989   7.660 23.193  5.430  11.423   4.040
Costa Rica  39.463   11.870 33.270   9.380 30.149  6.480  16.238   5.480
Croatia 36.586    10.760 32.284   8.980 23.328  4.780  13.537   4.480
Cyprus 37.123    9.760 31.503   7.860 23.764  4.450  11.859   3.480
Czech Republic  36.820   10.910 31.375   8.690 23.978  4.950  11.826   3.910BIS Papers No 30  189
 
Table 8 (cont) 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s 
foreign and local currency ratings 
Agency  S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 








Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects (cont)          
Denmark  38.360  9.380 29.897  6.880 26.363  4.600   7.895  2.150
Dominican Republic  38.269  12.400 32.239   9.560 30.655  6.800  18.846  6.970
Ecuador 38.642   12.060 34.761   10.510 25.128  5.550  19.327  6.970
Egypt  30.896   10.180 29.295   9.540 19.215  4.590  11.276  4.250
El Salvador  35.873  11.580 29.702   8.800 24.268  5.580  14.114  5.200
Estonia 36.972   11.500 29.650   8.300 27.612  6.030  12.079  4.190
Finland  36.491  8.890 27.110  6.100 26.513  4.700   6.196  1.690
France  34.486  8.610 27.636  6.530 22.736  4.050   7.248  2.010
Germany  35.456   8.850     24.001  4.270   7.269  2.010
Greece          23.261  4.310   9.722  2.800
Guatemala             16.280   6.170
Hong Kong SAR  42.158  11.200     32.084  6.070     
Hungary         24.702   5.080     
Iceland 41.818   10.380 31.264   7.140 27.720  4.870   8.048  2.230
India  31.870  12.330     21.837  6.190  15.682  7.020
Indonesia  32.841  11.540 29.574  9.980 23.548  5.990  17.839  7.220
Ireland  37.489   9.390     26.707  4.770   8.711  2.450
Israel 37.226   9.370 32.177   7.990 21.479  3.870  10.981  3.090
Italy  33.010  7.990 29.440  6.960 19.251  3.340   7.742  2.100
Jamaica 35.997   10.120 34.626   10.150 22.921  4.660  11.676  3.760
Japan  34.617  7.990 31.204  7.300 20.567  3.390   7.603  1.980
Jordan  34.562  10.920 32.587  10.230 22.675  5.220  15.437  5.550
Kazakhstan 35.176   11.550 28.188   8.300 26.046  6.260  14.228  5.450
Kuwait  37.615   10.110     25.484  4.810  14.352  4.270
Latvia 36.325   11.560 30.374   8.870 25.933  5.850  12.829  4.590
Lebanon 35.836   9.370 36.395   10.130 22.581  4.370  15.976  4.760
Lithuania 36.458   11.320 31.195   8.930 26.082  5.790  13.767  4.790
Malaysia  35.989  11.030 31.147  9.020 24.230  5.350  12.750  4.400
Malta  36.123   9.870     23.025  4.490  13.197  4.050
Mauritius            12.026   4.140
Mexico 39.169   11.620 32.694   9.030 27.604  5.880  15.226  5.130
Moldova            18.243   7.750
Mongolia  37.041  11.780     24.691  5.480     
Morocco 33.859   11.220 30.190   9.710 22.095  5.310  14.429  5.420
Netherlands  37.108   9.170     26.405  4.710   7.186  1.990
New Zealand  37.625  10.050 28.299  7.000 26.987  5.130   8.080  2.400190  BIS Papers No 30
 
Table 8 (cont) 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s 
foreign and local currency ratings 
Agency  S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 








Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects (cont)                
Nicaragua     30.400   10.390     14.347    5.670
Norway  39.149    9.610     28.197  4.910   9.101   2.490
Oman 40.673    11.660 32.591   8.510 31.162  6.520  16.078   5.180
Pakistan  30.697   11.400 28.556  9.950 21.952  6.060  17.578   7.520
Panama               
Papua New Guinea  32.810   11.660     22.335  5.810  15.894   6.590
Paraguay  37.156    12.600     27.770  6.800  18.626   7.290
Peru  36.977   12.040 32.898  10.050 28.206  6.640  15.282   5.620
Philippines  32.411   11.240 29.233  9.850 21.378  5.350  13.338   5.330
Poland 36.635    11.040 30.687   8.630 25.441  5.450  11.975   4.030
Portugal  34.721    9.280     23.997  4.550   8.481   2.540
Qatar  40.000    9.770     26.635  4.650  14.710   4.040
Romania 38.991    12.850 34.770   10.550 29.474  6.930  20.244   7.560
Russia 35.430    11.070 32.009   9.180 24.258  5.310  17.049   6.140
Senegal        24.887   6.810     
Singapore  35.674   8.950     23.292  4.100   7.136   1.990
Slovakia 37.991    11.490 32.044   8.990 25.251  5.370  12.211   4.160
Slovenia 37.127    10.310 30.644   7.890 23.436   4.510     
South Africa  35.953   11.180 29.310   8.460 24.724  5.500  11.810   4.120
Spain  35.348  9.100 28.584  7.000 24.312  4.530   7.837   2.270
Sweden  37.393    9.120     24.457  4.180   7.650   2.080
Switzerland  39.128    9.490     28.306  4.950   8.411   2.280
Thailand  33.952   10.990 30.294  9.300 24.058  5.640  12.422   4.540
Trinidad 37.049    10.550 32.732   8.840 24.834  5.090  13.992   4.500
Tunisia  34.659    11.100     22.762  5.280  13.575   4.920
Turkey 38.494    11.610 33.704   9.780 28.213  6.090  19.083   6.490
Ukraine 34.907    12.320 30.390   9.840 26.194  6.530  20.564   8.480
United Kingdom  37.322    9.360 29.444   7.000 26.323  4.720   8.137   2.300
United States  37.749    9.170     26.569  4.640   8.305   2.260
Uruguay 38.842    11.300 33.406   9.030 28.855  6.010  16.581   5.370
Venezuela 39.969    11.910 34.759  9.520     21.854    7.350
Vietnam          22.940  6.270     
Asia average  35.473   3.31
1 29.931  3.57
1 24.272   4.55
1  11.963    2.93
1
Non-Asia average  36.897   3.47
1 31.457  3.58
1 25.381   4.85
1  13.124    3.07
1
1  Standard deviations are given for the average Asian and non-Asian fixed effect. Asian countries are shaded. 
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Table 9 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s foreign 
and local currency ratings, common sample 
Agency  S&P Moody’s  S&P  Moody’s 








R-squared    .9954   .9959   .9880   .9947 
F-test of significance of 
fixed effects, p-value    <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001 
Hausman test, fixed/ 
random effects, p-value    .0209   .1801   .0026   .0010 
Degrees of freedom    219  220  269   274 
Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff  t-stat  Coeff t-stat 
Macroeconomic           
Inflation, log 1-yr         0.308   2.830    
Inflation, 1-yr            
Inflation, log 10-yr            
Per capita GDP, log  –2.711 –5.950 –2.121 –4.980 –2.375 – 3.510  –0.873  – 2.280
GDP growth, 3-yr avg          –0.084  –  2.700
M2, 10-yr % chg           
M2, log 10-yr % chg           
M2, 1-yr log volatility         0.311   1.920    
M2, 5-yr volatility           
M2/reserves, 5-yr log 
volatility   0.713   3.230  0.995  4.970      0.909    4.910 
M2/reserves, log 10-yr 
% chg           
M2/reserves, 1-yr 
volatility           
M2/reserves, log 5-yr % 
chg           
Investment  –0.069 –3.000 –0.086 –3.920 –0.029   –0.940     
Saving                
Political             
Political risk score  –0.046  –2.760 –0.029 –1.820 –0.024  –1.090     
Regulatory quality      –1.497 –6.400        
Control of corruption  –1.140  –2.750     –0.972 – 1.960     
Government finance                
Public  debt/GDP   0.045   6.770      0.073   7.730   0.040    6.430 
Domestic debt/GDP                 
Budget revenue/GDP                 
External           
Net  debt/exports       0.004  2.480        
Short-term debt/GDP                 
Import cover                 
Exchange rate rigidity    0.787    3.230     –0.005   –0.020     
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Table 9 (cont) 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s foreign 
and local currency ratings, common sample 
Agency  S&P Moody’s  S&P  Moody’s 








Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff  t-stat  Coeff t-stat 
Exchange rate, 1-yr chg          –0.012 – 2.800     
Real effective exchange 
rate           
Years since foreign 
currency default, log  –0.325  –2.430  –0.221 –1.790        
Years since local 
currency default, log          –0.660 – 1.720     
Years since local 
currency default           
Time-series fixed 
effects           
Year 1995           
Year 1996  –0.215 –0.600   0.059   0.190 –1.545 – 1.270  –0.214   –0.260
Year 1997  –0.058 –0.180   0.516   1.730 –0.973   –1.370 –0.248   –0.500
Year 1998  –0.213 –0.930   0.456   2.240 –0.646 – 2.370    0.220    1.220
Year 1999  –0.443 –2.170   0.255   1.380 –0.262 – 1.100    0.044    0.280
Year 2000  –0.266 –1.350   0.158   0.900 –0.272 – 1.180    0.071    0.460
Year 2001  –0.148 –0.780   0.196   1.150 –0.200 – 0.860    0.042    0.280
Year 2002  –0.263 –1.470   –0.177 –1.060 –0.376 – 1.830  –0.025   –0.170
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects              
Argentina  39.570   9.620   34.692  8.830 35.235  5.710  19.210   5.350
Australia  36.199   8.100  28.422  6.690 30.294  4.550   7.289   1.850
Austria                
Bahrain                
Barbados                
Belgium                
Bolivia                
Botswana         28.629   5.140  10.885    3.360
Brazil  37.071   9.640   32.753  8.940 30.491  5.300    18.052    5.390
Bulgaria 33.426    9.130   32.276   9.680 29.534  5.510    15.930    5.020
Canada  33.786   7.190   28.552  6.680 26.811  3.860   5.802    1.390
Chile  36.166   9.590   31.014  8.710 29.023  5.160    10.972    3.280
Colombia 30.443    7.980   25.606   7.110 27.059  5.160   9.520    2.910
Costa Rica  37.060    9.570  32.133  8.910 33.356  5.830    14.695    4.300
Croatia 34.400    8.690   31.170   8.530 26.913  4.430    12.095    3.470
Cyprus 34.230    7.720   30.211   7.390 27.498  4.170    10.130    2.580
Czech Republic  34.822    8.830  30.308  8.260 27.211  4.490    10.487    3.020
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Table 9 (cont) 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s foreign 
and local currency ratings, common sample 
Agency  S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 








Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects (cont)             
Denmark 35.246    7.400  28.507   6.430 29.739   4.230   6.134   1.450
Dominican Republic  35.755    9.780  31.099  9.060  34.246  6.050    17.399    5.580
Ecuador 36.262    9.650  33.006   9.680 28.911   5.110   17.471   5.420
Egypt  28.747   8.190  28.293  9.050  22.728  4.400   9.921    3.220
El Salvador  32.775    8.880  28.547  8.290  27.874  5.150    12.751    4.080
Estonia 35.197    9.110  28.555   7.850 30.841   5.380   10.684   3.220
Finland  32.920   6.830  25.521  5.610 29.454   4.250   4.067   0.960
France 31.425    6.750  26.284   6.100 26.562   3.840   5.439   1.310
Germany        27.516   3.970    5.412    1.300
Greece              
Guatemala              
Hong Kong SAR                 
Hungary              
Iceland 38.791    8.250  29.821   6.680 30.811   4.400   6.394   1.540
India          24.524  5.590   14.530   5.620
Indonesia  30.931   9.260  28.535  9.460  27.729  5.720   16.397   5.730
Ireland        30.222   4.380    6.914    1.680
Israel 34.039    7.380  30.900   7.530 25.650   3.780   9.224   2.240
Italy  29.818   6.220  28.038  6.500 23.316   3.290   5.695   1.340
Jamaica 33.626    8.170  33.567   9.650 26.204   4.280   9.918   2.740
Japan  31.765   6.340  29.971  6.900  23.786  3.180   5.841   1.300
Jordan  32.440   8.840  31.549  9.740 25.674   4.770   13.920   4.310
Kazakhstan 33.312    9.310  27.003   7.820 28.948   5.470   12.862   4.280
Kuwait        29.824   4.550    12.824    3.320
Latvia  34.623   9.380  29.303  8.410 29.186   5.220   11.496   3.580
Lebanon  33.029   7.470  35.215  9.610 26.295   4.100   14.101   3.600
Lithuania 34.212    9.080  30.055   8.460 29.583   5.260   12.306   3.720
Malaysia  33.847   8.910  30.055  8.550  27.586  4.950   11.355   3.400
Malta        26.762   4.200    11.673    3.110
Mauritius              
Mexico 37.193    9.390  31.509   8.550 31.178   5.360   13.861   4.040
Moldova              
Mongolia                 
Morocco 31.872    9.110  29.185   9.230 25.134   4.870   13.006   4.230
Netherlands        29.605   4.310    5.326    1.280
New Zealand  35.111   8.040  26.992  6.540  29.325  4.520   6.439   1.670194  BIS Papers No 30
 
Table 9 (cont) 
The determinants of Moody’s and S&P’s foreign 
and local currency ratings, common sample 
Agency  S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s 








Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects (cont)                
Nicaragua                  
Norway         31.563   4.460    7.284    1.730
Oman  38.029   9.320  31.326  8.000 34.929   5.960   14.607   4.100
Pakistan  28.435   9.000  27.448  9.390  25.254  5.660   16.048   5.920
Panama                
Papua New Guinea          25.262  5.310   14.443   5.180
Paraguay         31.890   6.350    17.309    5.880
Peru  35.454   9.880  31.861  9.560 31.107   5.970   14.024   4.480
Philippines  30.846   9.170  28.249  9.360  23.465  4.760   11.988   4.140
Poland  34.677   8.970  29.568  8.180 28.262   4.880   10.558   3.090
Portugal         27.063   4.140    6.578    1.700
Qatar         30.920   4.380    12.818    3.040
Romania 36.963    10.400  33.667   10.040 33.541   6.370   18.908   6.140
Russia  33.202  8.820  30.807  8.690 28.237   4.940   15.516   4.840
Senegal                
Singapore          25.594  3.650   5.476   1.320
Slovakia 35.933    9.310  30.909   8.520 28.566   4.830   10.749   3.180
Slovenia  34.746  8.280  29.469  7.470         
South Africa  33.759    8.970  28.144  7.990  27.465   4.970    10.311   3.130
Spain  32.397  7.180  27.208  6.490 27.726   4.220   5.962   1.490
Sweden         27.250   3.790    5.706    1.350
Switzerland         31.229   4.460    6.731    1.580
Thailand  32.163   8.920  29.257  8.840  26.611  5.060   11.044   3.510
Trinidad 34.435    8.380 31.531   8.370 28.781   4.790   12.344   3.440
Tunisia         25.662   4.790    12.084    3.800
Turkey 36.244    9.370  32.518   9.250 31.240   5.420   17.487   5.150
Ukraine 32.890    9.850  29.594   9.320 29.730   5.920   18.295   6.480
United Kingdom  34.690    7.480  28.127  6.550  29.196   4.270   6.513   1.590
United States          29.777   4.260    6.786    1.600
Uruguay 36.342    9.060  32.170   8.540 32.392   5.510   15.040   4.230
Venezuela  37.592  9.500  33.532  9.020         
Vietnam                 
Asia average  32.980    3.89
1 28.783   3.56
1 26.418    5.67
1   10.480    3.39
1
Non-Asia average  34.401    3.95
1 30.279   3.68
1 28.944    5.99
1   11.373    3.57
1
1  Standard deviations are given for the average Asian and non-Asian fixed effect. Asian countries are shaded. 
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R-squared     .8981   .8659   .6900   .8804 
F-test of significance of 
fixed effects, p-value     <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001 
Hausman test, fixed/ 
random effects, p-value     .0006    .0782    .0116    .0002 
Degrees of freedom     319    199    170    128 
Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Macroeconomic          
Inflation, log 1-yr    –0.174 –2.730           0.159   2.180 
Inflation, 1-yr       –0.028 –3.440        
Inflation, log 10-yr           –0.107 –1.690     
Per capita GDP, log      –2.608 –5.030        
GDP growth, 3-yr avg                 
M2, 10-yr % chg          –0.001 –3.350     
M2, log 10-yr % chg        0.100  1.970         
M2, 1-yr log volatility                 
M2, 5-yr volatility   –0.011 –1.890           0.110   1.790 
M2/reserves, 5-yr log 
volatility          
M2/reserves, log 10-yr % 
chg   0.101   3.150          –0.072 –2.040
M2/reserves, 1-yr 
volatility     –0.006 –2.970        
M2/reserves, log 5-yr % 
chg         0.089   2.680   
Investment          
Saving       0.073   3.210         
Political          
Political  risk  score          
Regulatory  quality    0.509   2.950       
Control of corruption          –0.791 –2.350     
Government finance          
Public debt/GDP      –0.010 –1.740        
Domestic  debt/GDP           0.033   3.000 
Budget  revenue/GDP         0.050   1.680  –0.041 –2.160
External          
Net  debt/exports          
Short-term  debt/GDP         0.000   1.850   
Import cover    0.079   2.510       
Exchange rate rigidity                 
Exchange rate, 1-yr 
change       –0.006 –2.770   196  BIS Papers No 30
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Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
External ( c o n t )           
Real effective exchange 
rate       0.018   2.460     
Years since foreign 
currency  default,  log          
Years since local 
currency default, log    –0.567    –2.220       
Years since local 
currency default        –0.248 –4.500   
Time-series fixed 
effects           
Year 1995        0.501  1.990      –1.328  –4.840
Year 1996    1.228    6.650   0.338  1.390  –1.797 –3.810  –1.212  –4.470
Year 1997    1.078    6.090   0.325  1.560  –1.589 –4.060  –1.193  –4.800
Year 1998    0.852    5.170   0.330  1.900  –1.366 –3.920  –0.844  –4.230
Year 1999    0.468    3.040   0.109  0.690  –0.977 –3.310  –0.734  –3.840
Year 2000    0.485    3.170 –0.087 –0.580 –0.672 –2.990 –0.706 –3.710
Year 2001    0.358    2.450 –0.175 –1.160 –0.381 –2.110 –0.570 –2.990
Year 2002    0.232    1.660 –0.313 –2.210 –0.088 –0.570 –0.404 –2.140
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects            
Argentina   0.759    1.310 22.009   4.600    3.046   3.640     
Australia   2.238   1.880 25.821  4.840  25.155  4.470     
Austria   0.584    0.470 25.302   4.520        1.402    1.280 
Bahrain   1.590    1.560            
Barbados   3.833    3.940         –2.826  –3.420
Belgium                
Bolivia   3.358    2.450     42.320   4.290     
Botswana   –0.087    –0.060            
Brazil   2.769    3.530 19.932   4.550    1.767   1.420     
Bulgaria   3.047    2.420 18.875   4.590  20.894   3.940     
Canada   2.265    1.790 25.789   4.610      –0.696  –0.670
Chile   5.189    3.750 23.424   5.150 47.390   4.510 –1.081 –1.870
Colombia   7.109    4.430 23.118  5.440  46.876   4.410  –1.425  –2.150
Costa Rica    3.064    2.240    46.742   4.730  –0.117  –0.220
Croatia                
Cyprus   2.330    2.350 23.800  4.630  9.962    3.890  –1.451  –1.590
Czech Republic                
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Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects (cont)            
Denmark   2.371   1.720 26.125  4.610        0.613   0.510 
Dominican Republic   –3.019  –8.150       1.003    1.470     
Ecuador   2.741   4.550 19.607   4.600      –0.402 –0.470
Egypt   3.853   3.200 20.960   5.120  18.724   4.160     
El Salvador    1.481   2.880 19.790  4.880    2.073    2.650  –0.156 –0.350
Estonia   0.155   0.190 20.124   4.540    4.253    2.940     
Finland             
France   0.626   0.640  25.154   4.520        0.992   0.880 
Germany   0.318   0.310            1.911   1.850 
Greece   3.866   2.680  26.046   5.020  41.298   4.310     
Guatemala   3.722   2.620      44.976   4.490    0.138   0.310 
Hong Kong SAR   2.185  1.750             
Hungary   22.387   4.700  37.821   4.430     
Iceland   4.079   3.530            2.739   3.390 
India   3.778  3.370          –3.384 –4.790
Indonesia   3.437  3.080  17.240  4.420  14.085  4.290  –0.394 –0.510
Ireland                
Israel   3.645   3.430  24.928  4.590  13.686   4.260  –2.407 –2.120
Italy   1.443   1.370  25.481   4.500 11.850   3.470 –1.920 –1.330
Jamaica   2.726   2.680 22.972   4.960  10.595   4.390     
Japan   0.341  0.310 24.686  4.140         
Jordan   4.157   3.850 18.214   4.240  13.281   4.110     
Kazakhstan                
Kuwait   0.923   1.360            
Latvia                
Lebanon   0.349   0.280 21.571   4.460         
Lithuania                
Malaysia   3.851  3.830 21.163  4.530  10.913  4.260  –1.115 –1.790
Malta   2.794   2.840            
Mauritius     22.501   4.880         
Mexico   5.713   4.190      44.597   4.540  –0.948 –1.630
Moldova     16.644   4.650         
Mongolia   0.288 0 .460              
Morocco   4.212   3.970  17.415   4.260  11.801   4.370     
Netherlands   1.679   1.090          –0.247 –0.200
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Independent variables  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Cross-sectional fixed 
effects (cont)            
New Zealand   1.681   1.430  24.492  4.770  24.177  4.550     
Nicaragua     16.783   4.540         
Norway   1.547    1.300  25.300   4.420        2.152    1.990 
Oman   2.625    1.930            1.399    2.090 
Pakistan   4.206   3.730  15.497  4.370  12.046  3.820  –3.639  –5.560
Panama         23.914   4.290     
Papua New Guinea   3.835   4.010          –1.978  –2.350
Paraguay   5.162    3.620             
Peru   3.440    2.460  21.425   5.220  44.160   4.430     
Philippines   4.878   4.530  17.575  4.470  13.998  4.420  –2.444  –4.350
Poland   4.145    3.510  22.285   4.890 22.124   4.810   0.019   0.040 
Portugal   0.947    1.080  23.108   4.570   5.684   2.970 –0.139 –0.140
Qatar   1.983    2.110  23.922   4.120   6.494   3.130 –0.242 –0.310
Romania   3.788    2.830  19.746  4.770  29.041  4.210  –0.782  –1.080
Russia              
Senegal              
Singapore   –0.171   –0.180            
Slovakia              
Slovenia   3.348    4.250        3.548   2.550     
South Africa    4.522   4.510  22.469  5.060  7.579  2.670  –0.385  –0.560
Spain   2.369    1.490  23.931   4.480       0.613    0.780 
Sweden   1.151    1.310  27.070   4.780       1.363    1.140 
Switzerland    1.498    0.940           
Thailand   4.821   3.540  20.095  4.620 43.601  4.430  –1.826  –3.010
Trinidad   3.407    3.410        9.245   3.940     
Tunisia    4.940    4.750           
Turkey   2.416    1.960  19.034  4.130 20.297  4.570  –1.379  –1.430
Ukraine   0.766    1.250  16.151   4.210   0.485   0.440     
United Kingdom    1.086   0.820  25.085   4.610       1.207    1.360 
United States    1.551   1.120             0.662    1.310 
Uruguay   3.325    2.420  21.675  4.670 44.227  4.540  –0.595  –1.020
Venezuela     19.667   4.290   0.016   0.020     
Vietnam                 
Asia average    2.597    1.01
1 21.581   4.74
1 21.988   4.93
1  –1.857    0.60
1
Non-Asia average    2.579    1.04
1 21.883   4.70
1 20.109   4.61
1  –0.176    0.75
1
1  Standard deviations are given for the average Asian and non-Asian fixed effect. Asian countries are shaded. BIS Papers No 30  199
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